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DOUBLE SECRET PROTECTION: BRIDGING
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW TO PROTECT
PRIVACY RIGHTS FOR TELEMENTAL AND
MOBILE HEALTH USERS
JOSH SHERMAN†
ABSTRACT
Mental health care in the United States is plagued by stigma, cost,
and access issues that prevent many people from seeking and
continuing treatment for mental health conditions. Emergent
technology, however, may offer a solution. Through telemental health,
patients can connect with providers remotely—avoiding stigmatizing
situations that can arise from traditional healthcare delivery, receiving
more affordable care, and reaching providers across geographic
boundaries. And with mobile health technology, people can use smart
phone applications both to self-monitor their mental health and to
communicate with their doctors. But people do not want to take
advantage of telemental and mobile health unless their privacy is
protected. After evaluating the applicability of current health
information privacy law to these new forms of treatment, this Note
proposes changes to the federal regime to protect privacy rights for
telemental and mobile health users.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a single parent living in a small town and
that your child has just been diagnosed with a serious mental illness.
Treatment options in your area are few and far between. A handful of
psychiatrists and psychologists practice in your town, but none
specializes in treating your child’s condition. You would have to drive
over fifty miles to reach an appropriate specialist. As a sole provider,
this is unworkable with your schedule.
You are thus delighted when you learn that your child will not
need to travel at all to be treated by a mental health specialist. From a
computer at your home, your child can use videoconferencing
Copyright © 2018 Josh Sherman.
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technology to receive treatment. You and your child consult a
psychiatrist and a psychologist, and your child begins to meet regularly
and develop relationships with each. Your child’s prognosis steadily
improves, and you are grateful for the technology that has allowed it to
happen. But you are horrified when your computer is hacked and a clip
from your child’s therapy session is exposed over the internet. Your
child’s classmates learn of the clip and your child, shouldering the
burden of mental health’s stigma, begins to slip back into the confines
of mental illness.
Telehealth,1 the remote electronic provision of health care, can
connect patients and providers, alleviating healthcare access issues
such as the one in the above hypothetical. In particular, telehealth
expands access to specialists,2 to mental health providers in
geographically rural or sparsely populated areas,3 and to healthcare
1. Because terminology regarding telehealth is varied in the law and the legal literature,
this Note adopts the following definitions at the outset. Telehealth, the broadest term, refers to
“the use of advanced telecommunication technologies to exchange health information and
provide healthcare services across geographic, time, social and cultural barriers.” Jennifer M.
Little, Into the Future: The Statutory Implications of North Carolina’s Telepsychiatry Program, 93
N.C. L. REV. 863, 866 (2015) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting ADAM WILLIAM DARKINS
& MARGARET ANN CARY, TELEMEDICINE AND TELEHEALTH: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES,
PERFORMANCE, AND PITFALLS 2 (2000)). Whereas telehealth “includes the delivery of all health
care,” telemedicine refers more narrowly to the use of “medical treatment to treat a disease.” Id.
(emphasis added). Intuitively, telemental health describes the use of telehealth in mental health
treatment. Telepsychiatry and telepsychology both fall under telemental health’s umbrella.
Telepsychiatry, also a subset of telemedicine, involves the remote delivery of psychiatric care,
whereas telepsychology refers to the remote delivery of psychological care. Id. Other telehealth
variants, such as telepharmacology and teleradiology, are beyond the scope of this Note. For
clarification on the distinction between telehealth and mobile health, see infra note 9.
2. Sy Atezaz Saeed, John Diamond & Richard M. Bloch, Use of Telepsychiatry To Improve
Care for People with Mental Illness in Rural North Carolina, 72 N.C. MED. J. 219, 219–20 (2011).
Remote technology can also provide greater access to “the right provider in a culturally sensitive
context,” connecting, for example, Spanish-speaking patients and providers. Jessica Sun Choi,
Mental Health Services Via Skype: Meeting the Mental Health Needs of Community College
Students Through Telemedicine, 25 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 340 (2016) (quoting Brian
J. Grady, Nancy Lever, Dana Cunningham & Sharon Stephan, Telepsychiatry and School Mental
Health, CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC N. AM. (2011), https://www.e-psychiatry.com/
pro/Telepsychiatry-and-School-Mental-Health.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7YM-NFE2]); see also
Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison Population and the Search
for a Cost-Effective and Socially Acceptable Means of Addressing It, 15 ELDER L.J. 473, 492 (2007)
(noting similarly that, for inmates, “something as simple as access to bilingual specialists was
greatly improved by telemedicine, with prison health administrators particularly impressed by the
improved quality of psychiatric care”).
3. Saeed et al., supra note 2, at 219–20. This also creates a virtuous cycle—because
telehealth providers, wherever located, can reach greater populations of patients, telehealth has
“improved recruiting and retention of mental health professionals in underserved or rural areas.”
Id. at 220.
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providers generally for homebound patients.4 In addition, the
economic benefits of telehealth are laudable, reducing transaction
costs associated with traveling and waiting to see healthcare providers
in person.5 In the telemental health setting, where physical
examinations are generally not required to properly diagnose, treat,
and monitor patients,6 the cost-benefit calculus especially favors
telehealth. Another benefit is that obtaining treatment remotely
heightens anonymity because it reduces the odds of running into your
doctor in public and eliminates encounters with other patients in the
traditional waiting room setting. Patients can thus circumvent the
deterrent effects of stigma by obtaining treatment anonymously.7
Indeed, the most rapid expansion of telehealth is therefore occurring
in the behavioral health setting.8 Additionally, mobile health
applications and devices enable users to self-monitor and track
medications and symptoms, access “inferred data” generated from
such user inputs, and communicate either or both categories of
information to providers.9
4. See id. (discussing how telepsychiatry can increase “access to mental health services in
nursing homes, hospice, and other extended care facilities”).
5. Id. Telehealth also mitigates opportunity costs associated with missing work or school to
attend therapy sessions. Id. Additionally, these cost reductions translate to a “greater likelihood
of compliance with therapy.” Id. Telehealth also reduces costs for hospitals by providing access
to specialists not employed full-time on their campuses. Id. These cost benefits are also well
distributed, as telehealth has “reduced geographic and socioeconomic health disparities” by
affording greater access to medical professionals. Id.
6. Arthur J. Fried, Paul A. Gomez & Purvi B. Maniar, Behavioral Health and Population
Health Management: Is It Time for Real Progress?, 9 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 57, 86 (2016). But
see Choi, supra note 2, at 344 (“Although psychiatrists tend to have limited physical contact with
patients, in-person examinations may be required in certain situations, such as when prescribing
certain medications.”).
7. Choi, supra note 2, at 340; Saeed et al., supra note 2, at 220.
8. Fried et al., supra note 6, at 89.
9. David D. Luxton et al., mHealth for Mental Health: Integrating Smartphone Technology
in Behavioral Healthcare, 42 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 505, 506 (2011); see also J. Frazee,
M. Finley & J.J. Rohack, mHealth and Unregulated Data: Is This Farewell to Patient Privacy?, 13
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 384, 396–97 (2016) (“Inferred data is information that is inferred from
existing data through analytic models—for example, analyzing a user’s dietary patterns to predict
that this particular user will likely develop type 2 diabetes.”). For further terminological
clarification, mobile health (sometimes referred to as “mHealth”) refers to “medical and public
health practice supported by mobile devices.” Frazee et al., supra, at 385 (quoting WORLD
HEALTH ORG., MHEALTH: NEW HORIZONS FOR HEALTH THROUGH MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES
6 (2011), http://www.who.int/goe/publications/goe_mhealth_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR83JRNQ]). There are a wide range of mobile health applications dealing with various aspects of
physical and mental health. This Note, however, limits the discussion on mobile health
technologies to the mental health context. To the extent that information put into mobile health
applications is transmitted, whether synchronously or asynchronously, to health care providers,
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But in the age of WikiLeaks, Snapchat nudes, and easily
compromised email servers, concerns about telecommunication
confidentiality could not be more salient. In the healthcare context,
security concerns are particularly pressing.10 In one study, 94 percent
of healthcare organizations surveyed experienced a data breach in the
previous two years, and 45 percent experienced more than five such
breaches.11 Creating and enforcing laws to safeguard confidential
health information is essential. A mental-healthcare breach could
expose particularly sensitive information, making patient privacy
interests especially prominent.12
Privacy and security laws are thus vital to protect patients. The
federal landscape is governed by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the rules promulgated under
it, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules (the Rules). The Rules are
beginning to show signs of age following substantial advances in health
technology in the last twenty years.13 At the same time, states have their
the use of such technology properly qualifies as “telehealth” under this Note’s definition. To the
extent that health information put into or derived from mobile health applications is not
transmitted to providers (either because the data are not transmitted at all, or because data are
transmitted to nonprofessionals, such as the parents of a child user), mobile health falls outside
telehealth’s umbrella. This final distinction becomes relevant when analyzing the applicability of
the HIPAA Security Rule to these technologies. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.3.
10. See Pierron Tackes, Going Online with Telemedicine: What Barriers Exist and How Might
They Be Resolved?, OKLA. J.L. & TECH., Jan. 2015, at 1, 8 (highlighting consumers’ privacy
concerns and the commonality of health data breaches).
11. See Rene Quashie, Things That Should Keep the Telehealth Community Awake at Night
(Part 1), EPSTEIN, BECKER, GREEN: TECHHEALTH PERSPECTIVES (June 10, 2013),
http://www.techhealthperspectives.com/2013/06/10/things-that-should-keep-the-telehealthcommunity-awake-at-night-part-1 [https://perma.cc/SX3N-LRFC] (adding that “nothing
threatens the future viability of telehealth more than lax privacy and security”). For example, a
recent breach involving Emory Healthcare exposed health information of about 80,000 patients.
Rachel Z. Arndt, Emory Healthcare Cyberattack Affects 80,000 Patient Records, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170302/NEWS/
170309983/emory-healthcare-cyberattack-affects-80000-patient-records [https://perma.cc/X8HT6C3Y].
12. As one commentator notes:
[F]ear of security breaches may dissuade patients from disclosing sensitive or
stigmatizing information to their physicians. Considering the stigma surrounding
mental health treatment, the need to protect medical information in today’s age of
rapidly advancing technology remains vital to the expanding use of telepsychiatry and
telemental health services. Patient privacy is crucial to effective health care services, as
medical professionals need maximum information ‘to obtain adequate patient
histories, make correct diagnoses, and provide patients with appropriate treatments.’
Choi, supra note 2, at 351–52 (quoting Keith A. Bauer, Privacy and Confidentiality in the Age of
E-Medicine, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 47, 50 (2009)).
13. For further discussion of how HIPAA does not sufficiently protect telemental health
patient privacy, see infra Part III.A.
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own rules and regulations, often in conflict with one another.14 Further
complicating the picture, the terrain is ever changing, as more than one
hundred and fifty telehealth bills were introduced in state legislatures
during 2016 alone.15 Legal ambiguities disincentivize growth that would
otherwise be spurred by providers and institutional investors alike.16
Moreover, patients concerned for their privacy might be deterred from
using the technology in the first place.17 In order to capture all the
benefits that telemental health has to offer, the law must account for
the privacy interests of telemental health patients.
Part I of this Note traces problems in the infrastructure of mental
health care in the United States to the failures of deinstitutionalization.
It further examines the rise and promise of telemental and mobile
health and posits that privacy concerns threaten the appeal and utility
of these treatment and self-care modalities. Part II sketches out the
current legal environment, focusing on the Rules and their preemptive
status. Part III applies the Rules to telemental and mobile health,
identifies both formal and functional failings that render stored and
transmitted data inadequately protected, and proceeds to analyze state
approaches. Part IV advocates for a federal solution that addresses the
current deficiencies of the preemptory Rules as they pertain to
telemental and mobile health.
I. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND ALMOST-PROMISING REMEDIES
This Part explores historical and contemporaneous institutional
and cultural issues that frustrate the utility of mental health treatment.
Current issues with stigma, cost, and access to mental health care can
be traced to the mass release of long-term mental health patients from

14. See Adam D. Romney & Sean R. Baird, Skype Sessions: Emerging Legal Issues in TeleMental Health Services, 28 HEALTH L. 32, 32–33 (2015) (explaining the panoply of state privacy
and telemedicine laws). In addition, “[u]nlike some fields of healthcare, such as nursing, there is
currently not a reliable ‘interstate compact’ for the allied mental health professionals through
which a practitioner’s license in one state is recognized as sufficient to permit practice in another
state.” Id. at 32.
15. Most addressed Medicaid reimbursement, professional board standards, and interstate
licensing issues. See, e.g., Telehealth Medicaid & State Policy, CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH
POL’Y, http://cchpca.org/telehealth-medicaid-state-policy [https://perma.cc/F8CN-UCDJ]. For a
discussion of other state telehealth laws which address patient privacy and security, see infra Part
III.B.
16. Romney & Baird, supra note 14, at 33; see also Tackes, supra note 10, at 15 (“[T]he
complex matrix of differing state and federal regulation still remains the major barrier to the
standardization and widespread use of telemedicine.”).
17. Choi, supra note 2, at 351–52.
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institutional confinement. The insurgent growth in telemental health
promises to combat these stigma, cost, and access issues, but for a
glaring gap in the current regime—sufficient security with respect to
patients’ sensitive health information. Securing patient privacy is
necessary to realize the benefits of this otherwise promising
technology.
A. Deinstitutionalization
The mid-twentieth-century mass release of mental health patients
from long-term confinement, known as deinstitutionalization, resulted
in major stigma, cost, and access issues for mental health care.18 Before
deinstitutionalization, most mental health care patients received
treatment in institutions where patients were “locked away from the
public, monitored by doctors and nurses, and often abused by the
staff.”19 Expenses largely went toward housing for institutionalized
patients rather than their medical treatment—because long-term
patients were not expected to recover, they were generally denied
treatment altogether.20
The process of deinstitutionalization began in 1956 as researchers,
medical professionals, law enforcement, and government officials
began to doubt the prudence of widespread institutionalized treatment
for the mentally ill.21 Five years later, Congress created the Joint
Commission on Mental Health to streamline the process of
deinstitutionalization.22 Deinstitutionalization then progressed
rapidly.23 By the mid-1970s, the vast majority of mental institutions and
asylums had been shuttered.24
18. See Samantha M. Behbahani, Ivelisse Barreiro & Patricia Rivera, The Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act: Will Parity for Mental Health Care Truly Be Achieved in the 21st
Century?, 10 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 153, 155–58 (2015) (discussing the continuing
detrimental impacts of deinstitutionalization, such as the vicious cycle of incarceration for the
mentally ill); David Chorney, A Mental Health System in Crisis and Innovative Laws to Assuage
the Problem, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 215, 219–20 (2014) (arguing that telemental health
can help solve the nationwide post-deinstitutionalization mental health crisis).
19. Chorney, supra note 18, at 219.
20. CHRIS KOYANAGI, LEARNING FROM HISTORY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO LONG-TERM CARE REFORM 1, 4 (2007), https://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7684.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9HD-FUV3].
21. Chorney, supra note 18, at 219.
22. Id. The Joint Commission’s adopted posture centered around releasing mentally ill
patients from institutions into “community health centers.” Id.
23. Id.
24. Matthew Smith, Deinstitutionalization and After: What Went Right and What Went
Wrong With the Closure of Psychiatric Asylums?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 12, 2013),
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The Joint Commission’s deinstitutionalization posture advocated
transferring mental health patients to community health centers
designed for social reintegration.25 However, lacking sufficient funding,
the development of these centers lagged far behind the rate at which
mentally ill patients were ejected from long-term institutional
confinement.26 The lag had several consequences. For many patients
unable to seek or continue treatment in a community health center,
their families shouldered the burden of caring for them.27 But family
members were even less proficient at providing patients the medical
treatment they needed.28 Others were not that lucky. Mentally ill
patients in resource-deficient communities without family caregivers
were fundamentally helpless and exposed, and many were left
homeless.29
Deinstitutionalization also brought many mentally ill people into
the criminal justice system.30 The capacity- and treatment-related
inadequacies of community health centers left many patients with
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/short-history-mental-health/201305/
deinstitutionalization-and-after [https://perma.cc/BB52-KM55].
25. See generally THE JOINT COMM’N ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR
MENTAL HEALTH: FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM’N ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH
(1961) (advocating for community-based mental health care and against the construction of large
scale mental hospitals).
26. Chorney, supra note 18, at 220.
27. Id.
28. Id. Unable to provide actual medical treatment, family members were so helpless in the
face of mental illness that law enforcement officers and medical officials often encouraged them
to divert their mentally ill relatives into the criminal justice system as their best opportunity for
receiving treatment. As the psychiatrist and researcher Dr. Edwin Fuller Torrey found:
The mentally ill also are sometimes jailed because their families find it is the most
expedient means of getting the person into needed treatment. As the public psychiatric
system in the United States has progressively deteriorated, it has become common
practice to give priority for psychiatric services to persons with criminal charges
pending against them. Thus, for a family seeking treatment for an [sic] family member,
having the person arrested may be the most efficient way to accomplish their goal.
. . . [In surveys,] numerous family members [have] confided that either the police or
mental health officials had encouraged them in pressing charges against their family
members to access psychiatric care for them.
E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS
CRISIS 40 (1997).
29. See, e.g., John M. Quigley, Steven Raphael, Eugene Smolensky, Erin Mansur & Larry A.
Rosenthal, Homelessness in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (2001),
http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/ppic_homeless.pdf [https://perma.cc/4528-ABGR] (tracing
homelessness in California in part to the failures of deinstitutionalization).
30. Chorney, supra note 18, at 221. Mental health patients “deinstitutionalized” during this
period were about eight times more likely than the general population to be arrested. Larry
Sosowsky, Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Mental Health Patients: A Cautionary
Note, 137 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602, 1602–05 (1980).
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serious mental illness untreated, leading some to engage in deviant and
criminal behavior as a result of their conditions.31 Others struggled to
find work and turned to crime as their only means of income.32 Still
others fell prey to manifestations of mental health stigma. The conduct
of mentally ill people can diverge from social norms, often in ways that
are not criminal, but in ways that attract attention. “Crime” describes
conduct that so departs from social norms it can be described as “antisocial,” which is not the same as conduct that is off-kilter from social
norms. But “criminal” is in the eye of the beholder, and it is easier to
make an inferential leap to find criminal conduct if a degree of socially
abnormal conduct already exists.33 Together, these factors spawned a
vicious cycle—the more mentally ill people were seen as acting
“criminally,” the more they were brought into the criminal justice
system, the stronger the association between mental illness and deviant
behavior, and so on.34 The result was effectively reinstitutionalization,
as the mentally ill found themselves again confined to institutions
without much hope that jails or prisons would provide more adequate
treatment than the mental health institutions from which they had been
released.
Deinstitutionalization therefore failed to provide mental health
patients with viable opportunities for treatment. To the contrary,
between family caregiving, homelessness, and incarceration,
deinstitutionalization exacerbated stigma, cost, and access issues for
mental health patients. Today, stigma, cost, and access issues continue
to frustrate mental health treatment. Telemental and mobile health
could be an important part of overcoming each of these problems and
could account for the additional nuances of these problems that have
arisen since deinstitutionalization.

31. Chorney, supra note 18, at 220. While the lack of treatment was not a change from their
life inside institutions, these patients had previously been confined and therefore outside the
purview of the criminal justice system.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest
Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794, 794 (1984) (“Data from . . . 1,382 police–
citizen encounters . . . suggest[s] that the mentally ill are indeed being criminalized. . . . [F]or
similar offenses, mentally disordered citizens had a significantly greater chance of being arrested
than non-mentally disordered persons.”).
34. Chorney, supra note 18, at 220.
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B. Mental Health Today
Stigma, cost, and access issues continue to plague mental health
care treatment to this day.35 The stigma associated with mental illness
remains strong.36 On the micro level, stigma can foster self-destructive
behavior in mentally ill individuals who end up believing that they
cannot effectively treat and manage their conditions.37 The stigma of
mental illness also often prevents such people from seeking treatment
in the first place because they do not want to encounter other mentally
ill people when they seek treatment and fear being stigmatized

35. Mental illness itself has become widespread, now affecting nearly one in four adult
Americans. Romney & Baird, supra note 14, at 32. In addition, the incidence of mental illness is
increasing among high school and college students. Choi, supra note 2, at 334. Even if these
reported increases stem in part from heightened reporting, the numbers in and of themselves
underscore the magnitude of America’s mental health problem. What is more, the problem of
mental health is not self-contained, as medical studies link mental illness with physical illness and
increased mortality. For example, one study found that in eight states,
public mental health clients had a higher relative risk of death than the general
populations of their states. Deceased public mental health clients had died at much
younger ages and lost decades of potential life when compared with their living cohorts
nationwide. Clients with major mental illness diagnoses died at younger ages and lost
more years of life than people with non-major mental illness diagnoses. Most mental
health clients died of natural causes similar to the leading causes of death found
nationwide, including heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular, respiratory, and lung
diseases.
Craig W. Colton & Ronald W. Manderscheid, Congruencies in Increased Mortality Rates, Years
of Potential Life Lost, and Causes of Death Among Public Mental Health Clients in Eight States,
PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, Apr. 2006, at 1.
36. “[S]tigmas are cues that elicit stereotypes, knowledge structures that the general public
learns about a marked social group.” Patrick Corrigan, How Stigma Interferes with Mental Health
Care, 59 AM. PSYCHOL. 614, 615 (2004). “Commonly held stereotypes about people with mental
illness include violence (people with mental illness are dangerous), incompetence (they are
incapable of independent living or real work), and blame (because of weak character, they are
responsible for the onset of their disorders).” Id. at 616 (citations omitted).
37. Professor Corrigan explains the concept of “self-stigma,”
[l]iving in a culture steeped in stigmatizing images, persons with mental illness may
accept these notions and suffer diminished self-esteem, self-efficacy, and confidence in
one’s future. Research shows that people with mental illness often internalize
stigmatizing ideas that are widely endorsed within society and believe that they are less
valued because of their psychiatric disorder. Persons who agree with prejudice concur
with the stereotype “That’s right; I am weak and unable to care for myself!”
Id. at 618 (citations omitted); see also Beate Schulze & Matthias C. Angermeyer, Subjective
Experiences of Stigma. A Focus Group Study of Schizophrenic Patients, Their Relatives and
Mental Health Professionals, 56 SOC. SCI. & MED. 299, 299 (2003) (“[S]tigma [is] an ‘. . . attribute
that is deeply discrediting . . .’ and makes the person carrying it ‘. . . different from others and of
a less desirable kind.’ An awareness of the attribute then results in the belief that ‘. . . a person
with a stigma is not quite human.’ Stigma, then, affects the very identity of those the negative
attribute is ascribed to, and complicates interaction situations with . . . ‘the normals.’” (citation
omitted)).

SHERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1124

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/6/2018 10:22 AM

[Vol. 67:1115

themselves.38 On the macro level, stigma and false conceptions
surrounding the nature of mental illness impede progress toward
meaningful solutions.39
Stigma also contributes to the problems of cyclical incarceration,
as people associate mental illness with deviance and criminality.40 Just
as in the period immediately following deinstitutionalization, many
mentally ill Americans wind up imprisoned.41 Very often, prisons lack

38. L.H. Andrade et al., Barriers to Mental Health Treatment: Results from the WHO World
Mental Health Surveys, 44 PSYCHOL. MED. 1303, 1312 (2014); see also Corrigan, supra note 36, at
616 (“[P]ublic identification as ‘mentally ill’ can lead to significant harm . . . . [P]eople with
concealable stigmas . . . may opt to avoid the stigma all together [sic] by denying their group status
and by not seeking the institutions that mark them (i.e., mental health care). [Through] [t]his kind
of label avoidance . . . stigma impedes care seeking.” (citations omitted)).
39. Professor Corrigan explains the concept of “structural stigma”:
Stigma as a social-cognitive construct is only one of several stigma-related factors that
undermine obtaining mental health care when in need. . . . [O]ther interpersonal,
economic, and policy factors . . . also mitigate service use. One manifestation of these
factors is structural stigma; namely, economic and political pressures on the culture,
rather than psychological influences on the individual, that yield discrimination and
undermine care access. . . . [T]he products of these forces are social and institutional
structures that rob people of opportunities.
Corrigan, supra note 36, at 620 (citations omitted). One pattern of “intended structural stigma as
applied to African Americans” was the Jim Crow laws. Id. at 621. For the mentally ill, “[t]hreats
to confidentiality may also be an example of intended structural discrimination, especially
relevant to care seeking.” Id. In addition, political opponents of mental health parity may
perpetuate “unintended structural stigma.” Id. Such politicians and lobbyists do not “blame [the
mentally ill] for their illness,” but “they cite financial concerns that are frequently at the root of
structural discrimination.” Id. This “inability to shake business concerns despite evidence to the
contrary is an example of the ongoing influence of structural stigma.” Id.; see also Chorney, supra
note 18, at 220 (“Mental health continues to be socially misunderstood and this misunderstanding
continually leads to failed policies.”).
40. See Nicolas Rüsch, Matthias C. Angermeyer & Patrick W. Corrigan, Mental Illness
Stigma: Concepts, Consequences, and Initiatives to Reduce Stigma, 20 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 529, 531
(2005) (“In the case of mental illness, angry prejudice may lead to withholding help or replacing
health care with the criminal justice system. . . . This association between perceived dangerousness
of persons with mental illness, fear, and increased social distance has been validated for different
countries, including Germany, Russia and the United States.”); Corrigan, supra note 36, at 616
(“Criminalizing mental illness occurs when police, rather than the mental health system, respond
to mental health crises . . . . Persons exhibiting symptoms and signs of serious mental illness are
more likely than others to be arrested by the police.” (citations omitted)); Stephanie Hartwell,
Triple Stigma: Persons with Mental Illness and Substance Abuse Problems in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 84, 85 (2004) (“Simply put, suspect populations are groups of
individuals who are stigmatized. Thus, they include drug addicts, drug dealers, and the mentally
ill. They are stigmatized so their actions and behaviors are non-normative, and public tolerance
and policy dictates efforts to contain and manage them.”).
41. Chorney, supra note 18, at 218; see also Alexandra Gates, Samantha Artiga & Robin
Rudowitz, Health Coverage and Care for the Adult Criminal Justice-Involved Population, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. 3 (2014), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/8622-healthcoverage-and-care-for-the-adult-criminal-justice-involved-population1.pdf
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the resources needed to provide adequate treatment for these mentally
ill offenders,42 continuing the vicious cycle in which institutional
deficiencies in mental health treatment exacerbate institutional failings
of the criminal justice system and vice versa.43
The stigmatic association between mental illness and criminality is
compounded for homeless mentally ill Americans.44 The homeless
population suffers greater rates of mental illness.45 The stress of
homelessness, in turn, exacerbates the problem of mental illness.46
And, of course, homeless people suffering from mental illness struggle
to afford treatment for their conditions.47 Further still, due to their
public exposure and the stigma of mental illness, homeless people who
suffer from mental illness are more likely to “perpetrate criminal acts
that are manifestations of their illness” and thus be arrested.48
Homeless people released from jails and prisons are also more likely
to reoffend,49 and homelessness also carries its own stigma and is itself
functionally criminalized. Homelessness thus furthers the vicious cycle
of incarceration for the mentally ill, adding a layer of complexity to
solutions that attempt to address the stigma-related problems in mental
health today.
Additionally, cost-related issues prevent many patients from
receiving care.50 Even those who can afford to seek and receive some
level of treatment often cannot afford to continue treatment or pay for
[https://perma.cc/37EK-NBR8] (“Over half of prison and jail inmates have a mental health
disorder, with local jail inmates experiencing the highest rate (64%).”).
42. See Curtin, supra note 2, at 488 (noting that “[p]rison health care is significantly below
the quality of health care in normal society” (quoting Michael Taylor, California Grapples with
Aging Prison Population, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 1993, at A1) (alteration in original)).
43. Behbahani et al., supra note 18, at 167–68; see Risdon N. Slate & Laura Usher, Health
Coverage for People in the Justice System: The Potential Impact of Obamacare, 78 FED. PROB. 19,
20 (2014) (“For people with serious mental illness and other chronic health conditions, interacting
with police is often the first step in a long cycle of involvement with the justice system.”). In jails
particularly, high population turnover rates and a general dearth of reentry planning programs
further frustrate inmates’ ability to receive mental health treatment. Id.
44. One recent national study indicated that in the year prior to their arrest, 15.3 percent of
incarcerated adults were homeless. Greg A. Greenberg & Robert A. Rosenheck, Jail
Incarceration, Homelessness, and Mental Health: A National Study, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 170,
170 (2008).
45. Id. Homeless people are also more likely to have substance abuse problems and to suffer
trauma from past sexual and physical abuse. Id. at 173.
46. Id. at 170.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Chorney, supra note 18, at 221.
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medication.51 Budget cuts stemming from the economic recession have
compounded these cost issues in recent years, as cuts to Medicaid
increase out-of-pocket costs for individuals who qualify for disability
benefits due to serious mental disabilities such as schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder.52
Access-related issues also continue to loom large, adding to the
problems stemming from stigma and cost. There remains a dearth of
community resources through which patients can access the mental
health services that they need.53 Relatedly, there are major access
issues associated with the uneven geographic distribution of available
community resources—mental health resources are concentrated in
urban areas, exacerbating access issues for mental health patients in
rural communities.54 Many mental health patients seek care only from
primary care providers because there are fewer specialists available in
their communities.55 Between such stigma, cost, and access issues, over
40 percent of Americans with mental illness receive no treatment at
all.56
C. Enter Telemental Health
1. Introduction and Growth. Telemental health promises major
strides in mental health treatment, and its use is currently
proliferating.57 In its broadest form, telemental health involves the
provision of mental health services via telecommunication
technology.58 The two major subcategories of telemental health
51. See Ramin Motjabai, Trends in Contacts with Mental Health Professionals and Cost
Barriers to Mental Health Care Among Adults With Significant Psychological Distress in the United
States: 1997–2002, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2009, 2013 (2005) (noting increased likelihood for
lower income mentally ill individuals “to report forgoing mental health care because of cost” and
that such individuals were “almost twice as likely to forego medications”).
52. Chorney, supra note 18, at 221.
53. Id. at 220.
54. See Avery Schumacher, Telehealth: Current Barriers, Potential Progress, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
409, 418 (2015) (“Currently, rural areas are experiencing a major shortage of primary care
physicians and an even greater shortage of specialists. While 20% of Americans live in rural areas,
only 9% of physicians practice in these areas.”).
55. Behbahani et al., supra note 18, at 166.
56. Romney & Baird, supra note 14, at 32.
57. Erin Dietsche, More and More Businesses Are Offering Telehealth Services as an
Employee Benefit, MEDCITY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017, 5:44 PM), http://medcitynews.com/2017/08/
telehealth-employees/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/HVX5-P5QW].
58. Bill Marino, Roshen Prasad & Amar Gupta, A Case for Federal Regulation of
Telemedicine in the Wake of the Affordable Care Act, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 274, 275
(2015).
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explored in this Note are telepsychology and telepsychiatry, which use
videoconferencing software to connect patients and providers
remotely.59 This Note additionally explores mobile health technology,
which enables users to self-monitor their mental health conditions and
report information to their providers.
For about a quarter of a century, telemental health has bridged
access and cost issues for incarcerated mentally ill patients,60 and its use
is now beginning to grow in the general population.61 This growth is
happening very rapidly. One study estimates that 80 to 90 percent of
mental health treatment could be conducted remotely within a
decade.62 Telemental health thus represents the future of mental health
treatment—a future that is fast approaching.
Insurers and employers are contributing to this growth spurt.
Many major insurance companies are beginning to provide coverage
for telehealth and telemental health services,63 and other large
companies are following suit. In 2012, only 7 percent of large
companies offered coverage.64 In 2018, 96 percent of large companies
will be offering telehealth coverage as an employee benefit.65 And in
2018, 56 percent of large companies will be offering telehealth coverage
for behavioral health services—an increase of over twofold from
2017.66 Smaller companies are tagging along as well, with 24 percent of
all U.S. employers now offering general telehealth coverage and 42
percent expected to do so by 2018.67 Moreover, 33 percent of large
59. See Little, supra note 1, at 867 (explaining how telemedicine connects patients and
providers).
60. Brendan R. McDonald, Robert D. Morgan & Patrick S. Metze, The Attorney-Client
Working Relationship: A Comparison of In-Person Versus Videoconferencing Modalities, 22
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200, 201 (2016); see also Schumacher, supra note 54, at 419 (citing a
study showing that telepsychiatry reduces rates of violence in prisons).
61. Romney & Baird, supra note 14, at 32.
62. Id.
63. Alex Ruoff, Most Major U.S. Companies Will Offer Telehealth Benefits, Hoping To
Please Workers, BLOOMBERG BNA: HEALTH CARE BLOG (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.bna.com/
major-us-companies-b73014446157 [https://perma.cc/T7HE-MQM5].
64. Id.
65. Bill Siwicki, Almost All Large Employers Plan To Offer Telehealth in 2018, but Will
Employees Use It?, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 18, 2017, 3:33 PM), http://www.
healthcareitnews.com/news/almost-all-large-employers-plan-offer-telehealth-2018-willemployees-use-it [https://perma.cc/7BNX-28ZB].
66. Id. These numbers underscore the immediate import of a sound legal approach to the
unique legal issues posed by telehealth.
67. Genevieve Douglas, Employers Exploring New Health-Care Options, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.bna.com/employers-exploring-new-n73014446679 [https://
perma.cc/JVW7-HDS8].
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employers now provide their employees telehealth coverage by
contracting directly with telehealth vendors even though their insurers
do not provide coverage.68 Extending coverage will lift one of the main
impediments to increased telehealth consumption by making it more
affordable for patients.69
2. Advantages. Telemental health promises myriad advantages
that work against stigma, cost, and access issues. Given the stigma of
mental illness, remote access is particularly helpful for mental health
treatment, allowing patients to seek care with greater assurance of
anonymity.70 Telemental health also reduces costs in several ways,
including cutting transaction and transportation costs through
streamlined healthcare delivery that connects patients and providers
remotely.71 Telehealth generally also saves costs down the road by
incentivizing and facilitating preventative care.72 Research already
illustrates the clinical efficacy of telemental health,73 even pointing to
better outcomes from telemental health than conventional health

68. Ruoff, supra note 63.
69. See Behbahani et al., supra note 18, at 155 (explaining that patients experience
unaffordability due to lack of coverage as particularly limiting in the mental health context); Fried
et al., supra note 6, at 89 (noting a general trend by insurers toward placing telehealth coverage
on par with coverage for conventional treatment); Little, supra note 1, at 872 (citing potential
affordability problems stemming from lack of insurance coverage as one of telepsychiatry and
telemedicine’s main limitations).
70. Choi, supra note 2, at 340; Little, supra note 1, at 871.
71. Little, supra note 1, at 871. In addition, rising costs increasingly prevent Americans from
accessing affordable health care. See, e.g., Schumacher, supra note 54, at 414–15 (explaining that
healthcare spending comprises an increasingly large portion of the U.S. gross domestic product,
well outpacing that of other industrialized countries, and yet does not translate to better
outcomes).
72. Douglas, supra note 67. Employers are expected to save an average of anywhere between
$100 and $700 per patient per visit by providing employees telehealth coverage. See Jamie Gooch,
Telemedicine Is Poised for Growth, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine.com/managed-healthcare-executive/news/
telemedicine-poised-growth?page=full [https://perma.cc/Y8P7-GALA] (“Cost saving estimates
vary . . . [reaching] as much as $700 per consultation. Schoenberg says savings depend on the
population and geography, but approximates an urgent care center visit at $150, and an
emergency room encounter at $500. By contrast, . . . a telehealth visit costs around $50, including
all the technology needed.”). But see generally J. Scott Ashwood, Ateev Mehrotra, David Cowling
& Lori Uscher-Pines, Direct-To-Consumer Telehealth May Increase Access to Care but Does Not
Decrease Spending, 36 HEALTH AFF. 485 (2017) (suggesting that increased access through
teleconferencing-based telehealth platforms may result in increased spending).
73. Little, supra note 1, at 871.
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treatment—attributable in part to increased access to preventative care
and continuity of care.74
Telemental health is a particularly effective avenue to bridge
access issues, allowing patients to reach mental health professionals
electronically where they could not otherwise reach them physically.75
This is particularly true in rural communities.76 This makes telehealth
particularly advantageous in the context of mental health treatment
where access issues are particularly salient.77 Telemental health can
connect patients with providers, and it can also connect providers with
other providers. Connecting providers with other providers can
improve treatment outcomes on the micro level by allowing providers
to obtain remote assistance for individual patients;78 on the macro level
by providing increased education, information, and interconnectedness
between doctors.79 With increased access between providers,
telemental health can also reduce unnecessary involuntary
commitments by enabling local generalists to connect remotely to a
psychiatrist who can determine whether involuntary commitment is
necessary.80 But for all of its strengths, telemental health has yet to
overcome a glaring obstacle standing in the way of its full potential—
patient privacy.
3. Privacy Problems Make for a Poison Pill. In general, privacy
and security concerns in health care have become quite extensive, and
telemental health solutions that are packaged with new security risks
74. E.g., id. Indeed, the American Medical Association (AMA) has not only endorsed the
clinical efficacy of telehealth and telemental health treatment but has placed it on par with
traditional methods of care, recommending that the same standard of care applicable to doctors
in a traditional setting apply in telehealth contexts. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Adopts
New Guidance for Ethical Practice in Telemedicine (June 13, 2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/
ama-adopts-new-guidance-ethical-practice-telemedicine [https://perma.cc/9NBG-NC36]. The
American Psychiatric Association (APA) has also specifically endorsed telepsychiatry as “a
validated and effective practice of medicine that increases access to care.” Telepsychiatry, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/telepsychiatry
[https://perma.cc/EF23-AWQ7]. The APA also points to “a robust evidence base that shows
telepsychiatry leading to improved outcomes and higher patient satisfaction ratings.” Id.
75. Saeed et al., supra note 2, at 219–20.
76. Id. In addition, this can alleviate access problems stemming from demographic
dispersion. See, e.g., Schumacher, supra note 54, at 418 (“While 20% of Americans live in rural
areas, only 9% of physicians practice in these areas.”).
77. Little, supra note 1, at 871.
78. Saeed et al., supra note 2, at 220.
79. See id. (discussing the benefits of “[t]elehealth-facilitated training” and “reduced
professional isolation” for mental health professionals).
80. Little, supra note 1, at 871.
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make them much less attractive to patients.81 Medical records are
increasingly exposed through data breaches.82 From 2011 to 2016, cyber
attacks against healthcare providers increased over twofold.83 Financial
incentives are increasingly driving hackers to target healthcare
providers, when in the past hackers mainly targeted the retail and
financial sectors.84 By some estimates, medical information is about ten
times more valuable than a credit card number on the black market,
largely because the information is just as useful in fraudulent payment
schemes and its theft can take much longer to detect.85
In telehealth treatment, these concerns are amplified by the
increased use of telecommunications technology. First, the volume of
health-sensitive electronic transmissions increases significantly
through telepsychology and telepsychiatry.86 Mobile health

81. See Teresa Piliouras et al., Impacts of Legislation on Electronic Health Records Systems
and Security Implementation, IEEE LONG ISLAND SYS., APPLICATIONS & TECH. CONF. 7 (2012)
(“Healthcare systems require an especially high degree of information security.”).
82. Beth Walsh, Top Legal Issues in Healthcare Include Cybersecurity, HIPAA,
Telemedicine, CLINICAL INNOVATION + TECH. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.clinicalinnovation.com/topics/ehr-emr/top-legal-issues-healthcare-include-cybersecurity-hipaatelemedicine [https://perma.cc/67ZV-R952].
83. Bill Yager, Three Health IT Trends to Watch in 2016: Cybersecurity, Telemedicine and
Partnerships, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.healthcareinformatics.com/article/three-health-it-trends-watch-2016-cybersecurity-telemedicine-andpartnerships [https://perma.cc/EB93-RPCN].
84. Id.
85. As one article notes,
The data for sale includes names, birth dates, policy numbers, diagnosis codes and
billing information. Fraudsters use this data to create fake IDs to buy medical
equipment or drugs that can be resold, or they combine a patient number with a false
provider number and file made-up claims with insurers, according to experts who have
investigated cyber attacks on healthcare organizations. Medical identity theft is often
not immediately identified by a patient or their provider, giving criminals years to milk
such credentials. That makes medical data more valuable than credit cards, which tend
to be quickly canceled by banks once fraud is detected. Stolen health credentials can
go for $10 each, about 10 or 20 times the value of a U.S. credit card number . . . .
Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth More to Hackers than Your Credit
Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals/yourmedical-record-is-worth-more-to-hackers-than-your-credit-card-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924
[https://perma.cc/NEC8-Y3TC].
86. See Joseph L. Hall & Deven McGraw, For Telehealth To Succeed, Privacy and Security
Risks Must Be Identified and Addressed, 33 HEALTH AFF. 216, 217 (2014) (noting that the
“relevant threats” for a telehealth system “include breach of confidentiality during collection of
sensitive data or during transmission to the provider’s system; unauthorized access to the
functionality of supporting devices as well as to data stored on them; and untested distribution of
software and hardware to the patient”). Further, communications between patients and providers
often implicate interoperability—“the need to have different systems work together”—such that
“telehealth systems may have to accommodate varying versions of critical programs running
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applications can also involve extensive data transmissions between
patients and providers and leave data stored on patient mobile devices
and third-party servers.87 Patient use creates additional risks,
heightening the need for providers to secure their storage and
transmissions as much as possible.88 Because telemental and mobile
health treatment amplify privacy and security concerns, the existing
legal framework may not be adequate to protect patient and consumer
interests.
II. CURRENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
This Part examines the law governing patient privacy in health
care. It begins with an overview of the first wave of patient privacy
legislation and proceeds with a discussion of HIPAA, the seminal piece
of legislation in this sphere, along with its amendments and constituent
regulations. It concludes by explaining HIPAA’s preemptive effect on
state laws.
A. Privacy Legislation Pre-HIPAA
In the decades prior to HIPAA, the healthcare industry lacked any
generally accepted or legally mandated privacy and security
standards.89 In 1966, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) became
the first piece of federal legislation to address patient privacy at all, and
that fact was incidental to the legislation’s primary purpose.90 The
thrust of FOIA was to provide individuals the right to request
information regarding the activities of federal agencies, but FOIA
carved out an exception to this right for personal medical information
relevant to resolving administrative adjudications.91

across a host of operating systems.” Robert A. Heverly, Telemedicine, Telehealth, and
Cybersecurity, 20 N.Y. ST. BAR. ASSOC. HEALTH L.J. 35, 35 (2015).
87. See Frazee et al., supra note 9, at 397 (noting that “the bulk of [mobile health] user data
is stored on servers.”); Hall & McGraw, supra note 86, at 218 (“[M]edical and consumer devices
typically used by patients for telehealth applications can themselves pose serious risks, as the
devices contain numerous security flaws and are constantly under attack from threats such as
malware.”).
88. Hall & McGraw, supra note 86, at 217.
89. Francis Akowuah, Xiaohong Yuan, Jinsheng Xu & Hong Wang, A Survey of U.S. Laws
for Health Information Security & Privacy, 6 INT’L J. INFO. SEC’Y & PRIVACY 40, 42 (2012).
90. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
91. Id. Thus, this legislation conferred no special privacy protection to health data beyond
excluding their content from the newly created window of exposure. Id.
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In 1974, the Privacy Act became the first law enacted for the
express purpose of protecting patient confidentiality.92 The Privacy Act
also granted patients the right to access their medical records and the
right to make changes to them.93
B. HIPAA
HIPAA finally set the stage for meaningful reform with respect to
patient privacy. While enacted primarily to make health care more
efficient and affordable,94 HIPAA also contained provisions that aimed
to protect and secure health information.95 For example, the HIPAA
administrative simplification provision standardized the use of
electronic health information96 and mandated the development of
privacy and security standards for handling patient health
information.97 Pursuant to HIPAA, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) promulgated two comprehensive
regulations—designated as the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule for
the purposes of this analysis.98
Congress and the HHS have amended HIPAA, attempting to
respond to the ever-changing technological landscape.99 In 2009,
Congress passed the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) to strengthen HIPAA’s Privacy
and Security Rules.100 HITECH was also intended to promote
92. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2018).
93. See id. (balancing interest in patient privacy with free flow of information). The Privacy
Act also required healthcare facilities to document any disclosures of health information. Id.
94. As stated in the Act, Congress intended for HIPPA
to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and
individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health
care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to
long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health
insurance, and for other purposes.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936,
1936.
95. See generally id. §§ 261–264, 110 stat. at 2021–34 (concerning health information privacy
and security).
96. Id. § 262, 110 stat. at 2021.
97. Id. § 264, 110 stat. at 2033.
98. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000).
99. See Piliouras et al., supra note 81, at 1 (“Privacy legislation is in a state of constant
evolution as new technologies, privacy threats, and societal demands come into prominence.”).
100. See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, tit XIII, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (enacted as part of the American Recovery and Investment
Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111–5, 123 Stat. 115). The descriptions of the Rules, supra, are current post-
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widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) by 2014, so it
created incentives for providers to increase the rate of EHR
adoption.101 In 2013, the HHS finalized the Omnibus Rule, making
significant regulatory changes pursuant to HITECH.102
As it stands today, the Privacy Rule103 regulates the use and
disclosure of “protected health information” (PHI)104 by “covered
entities,”105 which includes most healthcare providers, and their
“business associates.”106 Providers can generally disclose PHI to other
providers without patient consent for treatment purposes.107 Mental
and behavioral health records have no additional protection as
compared with health information generally.108 However,
psychotherapy notes are excepted from the general rule of permissive
disclosure for treatment purposes—their disclosure requires patient

HITECH. HITECH extended the Rules to covered entities’ business associates, created new
breach notification requirements, and incorporated disclosure requirements into the use of
electronic health records (EHRs).
101. Id. §§ 13301, 13410, 123 Stat. at 246–58, 271–76.
102. See Press Release, US Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., New Rule Protects Patient
Privacy, Secures Health Information (Jan. 17, 2013), https://wayback.archiveit.org/3926/20150618191254/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/01/20130117b.html [https://
perma.cc/2Q4X-FFGN] (describing regulatory changes pursuant to HITECH, including
increased penalties for noncompliance, strengthening HITECH’s breach notification
requirements, granting patients the rights to access their EHRs in electronic form and to prevent
treatment information from reaching insurer’s hands when patients pay in cash, and prohibiting
the unauthorized sale of protected health information (PHI)). The HHS also streamlined
procedures for patients to consent to the use of their health information for research purposes in
response to a 2007 report by the Institute of Medicine arguing that HIPAA had frustrated its own
purposes in striking the balance between privacy and information flow by making such research
too difficult. See Akowuah et al., supra note 89, at 44 (“Research findings indicate HIPAA has
complicated healthcare process steps. It has also brought about increased documentation which
defeats its initial intent of reducing administrative process. Critical researches have been hindered
or discontinued as HIPAA has restricted the flow of needed information.” (citations omitted)).
103. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2017).
104. PHI refers to “individually identifiable health information . . . that is (i) [t]ransmitted by
electronic media; (ii) [m]aintained in electronic media; or (iii) [t]ransmitted or maintained in any
other form or medium.” Id. § 160.103; see also id. (defining “[i]ndividually identifiable health
information” as “a subset of health information”); id. § 164.514(a) (excluding “de-identifi[ed]”
data from the definition of PHI). Typical examples of PHI include medical and billing records.
Id. § 160.103.
105. Covered entities include providers, hospitals, insurers, and healthcare clearinghouses. Id.
§ 164.501.
106. Business associates include independent contractors of covered entities that receive and
process PHI. Id.
107. Id. § 164.506(c); see also id. § 164.501 (defining “treatment”).
108. See, e.g., id. § 164.502(a) (referring generally to “protected health information”).
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authorization.109 The Privacy Rule seeks to balance respect for patient
privacy with the therapeutic advantages conferred by the free flow of
information between providers.110
The Security Rule111 complements the Privacy Rule. Applicable
only to electronically processed PHI,112 the Security Rule establishes
standards for administrative,113 physical,114 and technical safeguards115
to ensure that patient privacy is protected.116 These standards operate
flexibly in several important ways. Some of these standards have
“implementation specifications,” which lay out different aspects of the
process to secure electronic records. For example, implementation
specifications for the standard of “[f]acility access controls” include
“[c]ontingency operations,” a “[f]acility security plan,” “[a]ccess

109. Id. § 164.508(a)(2). “Psychotherapy notes” are defined as:
notes recorded (in any medium) by a health care provider who is a mental health
professional documenting or analyzing the contents of conversation during a private
counseling session or a group, joint, or family counseling session that are separated
from the rest of the individual’s medical record. Psychotherapy notes excludes
medication prescription and monitoring, counseling session start and stop times, the
modalities and frequencies of treatment furnished, results of clinical tests, and any
summary of the following items: [d]iagnosis, functional status, the treatment plan,
symptoms, prognosis, and progress to date.
Id. § 164.501 (emphasis in original). The requirements for “authorization” are much stricter than
for consent. See id. § 164.508(b) (distinguishing “[v]alid” and “[d]efective” authorizations and
generally prohibiting both “[c]ompound” and “condition[ed]” authorizations).
110. Akowuah et al., supra note 89, at 42–43. This is embodied in and exemplified by the
minimum necessity principle that governs certain disclosures of PHI. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d)
(delineating varying “minimum necessary requirements” depending on type, target, and
frequency of disclosure that restrict the amount of information that can be disclosed). Thus, the
Privacy Rule also affords patients the right to access, id. § 164.524, and amend their PHI, id. §
164.526. But see Jamie Lynn Flaherty, Digital Diagnosis: Privacy and the Regulation of Mobile
Phone Health Applications, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 416, 436 (2014) (“HIPAA tends to err towards
safeguarding patients’ privacy . . . .”).
111. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–164.318.
112. Id. § 164.302.
113. Id. § 164.308. “Administrative safeguards are administrative actions, and policies and
procedures, to manage the selection, development, implementation, and maintenance of security
measures to protect electronic protected health information and to manage the conduct of the
covered entity’s workforce in relation to the protection of that information.” Id. § 164.304.
114. Id. § 164.310. “Physical safeguards are physical measures, policies, and procedures to
protect a covered entity’s electronic information systems and related buildings and equipment,
from natural and environmental hazards, and unauthorized intrusion.” Id. § 164.304.
115. Id. § 164.312. “Technical safeguards means [sic] the technology and the policy and
procedures for its use that protect electronic protected health information and control access to
it.” Id. § 164.304.
116. See id. § 164.306(a)(1) (“Covered entities must . . . [e]nsure the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of all electronic protected health information the covered entity creates, receives,
maintains, or transmits.”).
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control and validation procedures,” and “[m]aintenance records.”117
These implementation specifications are categorized as measures the
entities must treat as either required or “addressable.”118 Covered
entities must meet required specifications;119 but where specifications
are “addressable,” covered entities may determine for themselves
whether a particular implementation is contextually “reasonable and
appropriate” to further the protection of PHI.120 If so, the entity should
implement the specification.121 If not, the entity should document the
reasons for its determination and “[i]mplement an equivalent
alternative measure if reasonable and appropriate,” affording covered
entities an additional layer of discretion.122 In addition, even where
specifications are required, covered entities have flexibility with
respect to the means they choose to achieve conformity.123 Finally,
some standards do not have any associated implementation
specifications, affording entities even more flexibility in adopting
security measures or not.124
C. Complexities of Telemental Health Compliance Under State Law
Federal law here exists in tandem with state law. HIPAA
preempts state law whenever state law is less stringent with respect to
protecting patient privacy.125 State law can be formally inadequate,
where compliance with state law is insufficient to comply with HIPAA,
or functionally inadequate, where the federal purpose is frustrated.126
There are a range of state laws and regulations governing patient
privacy and security in the healthcare context that can come into play.
117. Id. § 164.310(a)(2).
118. Id. § 164.306(d)(1).
119. Id. § 164.306(d)(2).
120. Id. § 164.306(d)(3)(i).
121. Id. § 164.306(d)(3)(i)(A).
122. Id. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2) (emphasis added).
123. Id. § 164.306(b).
124. See, e.g., id. § 164.312(b) (“Standard: Audit controls. Implement hardware, software,
and/or procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information systems that
contain or use electronic protected health information.”).
125. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2017); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(c)(2) (2018) (“A regulation
promulgated under paragraph (1) shall not supersede a contrary provision of State law, if the
provision of State law imposes requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are
more stringent than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed under
the regulation.”).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(c)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b). State law that is more stringent, that
is, state law that confers greater protections to patients than HIPAA, is not preempted, adding to
the complexity of the legal interplay.
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States have laws governing privacy and security in healthcare generally
and also specifically relating to mental health care. Certain states also
have specific rules governing privacy and security in the context of
telehealth. Some states also have narrowly tailored rules specifically
for telemental health.127 Because HIPAA sets a preemptive floor, these
state laws may therefore provide patients with more protection than
they might otherwise have under current federal law.
III. DIAGNOSING INADEQUATE LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Part III analyzes how HIPAA applies to telemental and mobile
health. First, it explains why HIPAA does not apply to transmission
security in telepsychology and telepsychiatry sessions, but that
transmission security is covered when mobile health applications
asynchronously transmit information from patients to providers. Next
it discusses how, for telemental health, the Security Rule is formally
applicable to stored data but functionally inadequate—and for mobile
health, it is inadequate both formally and functionally because the data
is not stored by covered entities. Similar data storage security
inadequacies exist for psychotherapy notes because HIPAA
protections do not extend to archived psychotherapy sessions, despite
the fact that the policy rationale for the former ought strongly to
extend to the latter. This is because there is an inherent tradeoff
between keeping patient health information confidential and allowing
providers to access the information for treatment purposes—and with
archived psychotherapy sessions, as with psychotherapy notes, the
confidentiality consideration is particularly strong, and the access
consideration particularly weak. This Part finishes by outlining and
broadly categorizing state laws addressing privacy and security
concerns in health care generally, as well as state laws that specifically
address mental health care, telehealth, and telemental health.
A. Telemental Health Under HIPAA
Several aspects of telemental and mobile health implicate unique
privacy and security concerns. In telepsychiatry and telepsychology
sessions, all information disclosed in the course of treatment is

127. For examples of state laws governing privacy and security in general health care, mental
health care, telehealth, and telemental health, see infra Part III.B.

SHERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

DOUBLE SECRET PROTECTION

2/6/2018 10:22 AM

1137

channeled synchronously through electronic transmissions.128 The
same information is also transmitted in asynchronous communication
through mobile and other web-based health platforms that allow
patients to update their providers about their treatment or condition.129
Mobile health applications also generate inferred data from user
inputs, which can be transmitted to and stored by providers.130 Not all
mobile health data reaches providers; for example, mood-tracking
applications allow users to report their mood at given times and track
fluctuations themselves.131 Finally, providers may choose to archive
telepsychotherapy sessions for patients or other providers to access for
treatment purposes or as evidence to protect themselves in medical
malpractice actions.132 Applying the HIPAA Rules to these innovative
developments reveals the ways in which the Rules are both formally
and functionally outdated.
1. Synchronous Transmissions in Telepsychiatry and
Telepsychology Sessions. In its current form, the Security Rule does
not apply to telemental health sessions conducted with
videoconferencing software. Whereas the Privacy Rule protects all
PHI,133 the Security Rule only protects PHI that is “[t]ransmitted
by . . . [or] [m]aintained in electronic media,”134 or “ePHI.”135According to the HHS’s website, “[e]-PHI does not
include . . . video teleconferencing . . . because the information being
exchanged did not exist in electronic form before the transmission.”136
128. See Schumacher, supra note 54, at 416 (“Real time, or synchronous communication . . .
is instantaneous, and includes the use of interactive telecommunications devices such as audio
and video equipment.”).
129. See id. (“Store-and-forward, or asynchronous communication, refers to services that
transmit medical data, including clinical information and images, to a practitioner for later
assessment . . . typically . . . for diagnosis and treatment decisions . . . [and] remote monitoring, . . .
[which] can be useful in the management of chronic diseases.”).
130. See Frazee et al., supra note 9, at 396–97 (referring to “information that is inferred from
existing data through analytic models—for example, analyzing a user’s dietary patterns to predict
that this particular user will likely develop type 2 diabetes”).
131. Id. at 393.
132. Jeremy Henley, Healthy Privacy and Security Practices for Telemedicine, IDEXPERTS
(Mar. 23, 2016), https://www2.idexpertscorp.com/knowledge-center/single/healthy-privacy-andsecurity-practices-for-telemedicine [https://perma.cc/EV7C-4DJT].
133. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2017).
134. Id. § 160.103.
135. Id. § 164.306(a)(1).
136. Does the Security Rule Apply to Written and Oral Communications?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/2010/does-thesecurity-rule-apply-to-written-and-oral-communications/index.html?language=es
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Similar language and reasoning in the Security Rule’s preamble limits
its scope to exclude “video teleconferencing.”137 The preamble also
cross-references the HHS’s definition of “electronic media,”138 which
includes “[e]lectronic storage material” and “[t]ransmission media
used to exchange information already in electronic storage media.”139
The HHS’s most recent redefinition of “electronic media” suggests that
while “digitally produced [or recorded]” audio content should now fall
under the Security Rule’s protections for purposes of asynchronous
communication, discussed in greater detail below, live audio or video
teleconferencing is still excluded.140 The Security Rule will not apply to
the synchronous transmissions that occur during telepsychiatry and
telepsychology sessions because the data transmitted therein “did not
exist in electronic form immediately before the transmission.”141
[https://perma.cc/L5WE-ASDV]. The information exchanged through teleconferencing exists in
electronic form only as it is being transmitted.
137. See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8,334, 8,342 (Feb. 20,
2003) (“[B]ecause ‘paper-to-paper’ faxes, person-to-person telephone calls, video
teleconferencing, or messages left on voice-mail were not in electronic form before the
transmission, those activities are not covered by this rule.”). Some online telehealth vendors
currently rely on this language from the preamble in claiming not to be subject to the Security
Rule. See, e.g., Jenny Peddicord, Between Two Screens: Demystifying HIPAA Compliance for
Telepractice, HELLO FOUND. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://thehellofoundation.com/clinic/between-twoscreens-demystifying-hipaa-compliance-for-telepractice-4
[https://perma.cc/AK8V-3NU3]
(informing telehealth providers that their videoconferencing software need not comply with the
HIPAA Security Rule).
138. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8,342.
139. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Unlike in the preamble and on the HHS’s website, there is no explicit
exclusion of video teleconferencing from the definition of “electronic media” in the rule itself.
See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8,374 (“Certain transmissions,
including of paper, via facsimile, and of voice, via telephone, are not considered to be
transmissions via electronic media because the information being exchanged did not exist in
electronic form immediately before the transmission.”).
140. More specifically, the HHS
proposed to change the word ‘because’ to ‘if’ in the . . . definition of ‘electronic media.’
The definition assumed that no transmissions made by voice via telephone existed in
electronic form before transmission; the evolution of technology has made this
assumption obsolete since some voice technology is digitally produced from an
information system and transmitted by phone. . . . One commenter specifically
supported the change in language from ‘because’ to ‘if,’ noting the distinction was
important to provide protection for digital audio recordings containing protected
health information.
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg.
5,566, 5,575 (Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 HHS Report] (emphasis added).
141. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. But see Tatiana Melnik, Can Doctor’s [sic] Use Skype for
Telemedicine? Not in Oklahoma, 16 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 55, 57 (2014) (discussing
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision’s decision, applying state law subjecting
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Even if the HIPAA Security Rule were formally modified to
include audio and video teleconferencing, its protections would be
functionally inadequate to secure the PHI transmitted during online
treatment sessions. The implementation specifications about
requirements for secure transmission of this information under the
Security Rule are merely addressable.142 This means that telemental
health providers can avoid requirements to secure synchronous
transmissions simply by documenting why doing so would not be
“reasonable and appropriate.”143 Providers would thus have the more
attractive option not to implement integrity controls144 and not to
encrypt transmitted data.145 Encrypting these transmissions is vital in
order to keep the information from unwanted eyes.146 The lack of a firm

telehealth treatment to HIPAA’s requirements, and deeming a particular videoconferencing
software impermissible because, in addition to other deficiencies, it did not encrypt
transmissions). Thus, Oklahoma interpreted the HIPAA Security Rule to require encryption. If
anything, Oklahoma’s misapplication of HIPAA further highlights the need for a unified federal
approach.
142. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2).
143. Id. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1). Despite the apparent unreasonableness of neglecting to
take such basic precautions, governmental data suggest that health entities too often exploit the
lax documentary requirements in place to shirk their responsibilities to their patients, and failure
is not addressed by law enforcement until it is too late. One example of this failure is that
[l]arge numbers of covered entities and business associates—including many
sophisticated and well-heeled enterprises—clearly are not bothering to encrypt their
laptops and other mobile devices. . . . [T]he plethora of reported breach incidents . . .
suggests that covered entities and business associates are treating encryption and other
addressable Security Rule implementation specifications as if they were optional. . . .
OCR’s statistics regarding unencrypted laptops and removable storage technology,
along with descriptions of the underlying breaches, suggest that most covered entities
do not have current risk-assessment documentation to justify overriding the
addressable encryption specification.
Patricia A. Markus, Data Breach Reporting After HITECH: Welcome to the Land of Oz § 7:42, in
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 266–67 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2012).
144. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(i). “Integrity means the property that data or information have
not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.” Id. § 164.304 (emphasis in original).
145. Id. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii). “Encryption means the use of an algorithmic process to transform
data into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a
confidential process or key.” Id. § 164.304 (emphasis in original).
146. Heverly, supra note 86, at 38; Diane Hoffmann & Virginia Rowthorn, Legal Impediments
to the Diffusion of Telemedicine, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 39 (2011); see also Hall &
McGraw, supra note 86, at 217–18 (“Data encryption—where data are electronically ‘locked’
using complex mathematics and encryption ‘keys’––can ensure that if an attacker gains access to
the raw data, those data will be meaningless.”); Roger Hsieh, Improving HIPAA Enforcement
and Protecting Patient Privacy in a Digital Healthcare Environment, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 218–
20 (2014) (advocating for required encryption standards, arguing that encryption is cost-effective,
and highlighting several examples of prominent health data breaches of stolen devices wherein
the breached data were not encrypted).
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requirement to encrypt e-PHI transmissions thus further weakens the
Security Rule’s protections for telemental health patients.
2. Asynchronous Transmissions. Online and mobile health
applications also present ample opportunity for the asynchronous
transmission of health information between patients and providers.147
For example, mobile health applications let patients update their
psychologists about how they are feeling or update their psychiatrists
about medication compliance, side effects, or perceived efficacy. As
discussed above, electronically transmitted information only counts as
e-PHI if it “exist[ed] in electronic form immediately before the
transmission.”148 Fortunately, this should not be a problem in the
context of asynchronous electronic communication insofar as a patient
must necessarily input any information into an electronic device prior
to its transmission.149 To the extent that providers are on the receiving
end of e-PHI transmissions, the Security Rule thus formally governs
data transmitted asynchronously. Still, the Rule suffers the exact same
functional inadequacies as for synchronous transmissions.
In addition, some mobile health applications can transmit data
directly from users’ devices into their EHRs.150 Direct transmission to
EHRs requires “interoperability,” which, as a practical matter,
requires some level of industry standardization.151 Ironically, by
circumventing providers, the transmission of such data would fall
outside the Security Rule’s protections. Stricter standards here could
thus carry a triple benefit of providing more security for patients,
incentivizing greater use of mobile health applications that transmit
data directly to EHRs, and reducing the well-documented EHR
burden for providers, all while adhering to HITECH’s objectives to
standardize and maximize EHR usage. Moreover, the fix here is easy—
the Security Rule would just need to be narrowly extended to apply to
transmissions where data fall into EHRs on the back end.
147. See, e.g., Daniel F. Schulke, The Regulatory Arms Race: Mobile-Health Applications and
Agency Posturing, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1699, 1711 (2013) (explaining that most private health
information sent in this way is unencrypted).
148. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
149. The same would be true for inferred data generated based on inputted, and thus
electronically stored, information. The only exception would be audio and video recordings
through mobile health applications, which do not appear to be a prominent feature of such
applications.
150. See, e.g., Schulke, supra note 147, at 1712 (considering this to be “[o]ne of the more
important functionalities of [mobile health] applications”).
151. Id.
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3. Data Storage. The Security Rule’s formal applicability to stored
data does not run into the same wrinkles as for transmitted data. If PHI
is stored electronically, it is e-PHI, and the Security Rule applies.152
This means that providers must secure any health data they receive
from their patients through mobile health technology.153 Functionally,
however, the Security Rule’s protections appear inadequate. As with
transmission security, the implementation specifications requiring
specific security measures for access control are addressable and easy
to avoid by way of documentation.154 Thus, the Security Rule does not
require covered entities to encrypt stored e-PHI.155 This is a gross
oversight, as failing to encrypt stored data significantly increases the
probability of a data breach.156

152. 45 C.F.R. § 164.302. However, one possible wrinkle here concerns the varied regulatory
usage of “electronic storage media” and “electronic storage material”:
[The HHS] replace[d] the term “electronic storage media” with “electronic storage
material” to conform the definition of “electronic media” to its current usage, as set
forth [by] the National Institute for Standards and Technology . . . in recognition of the
likelihood that the evolution of the development of new technology would make use of
the term “electronic storage media” obsolete in that there may be “storage material”
other than “media” that house electronic data.
2013 HHS Report, supra note 140, at 5,575. Thus, the first subset in the definition of “[e]lectronic
media” now refers to “[e]lectronic storage material” instead of “[e]lectronic storage media.” 45
C.F.R. § 160.103. However, other aspects of the definition of “electronic media” appear
inconsistent with this terminological change. First, the second subset of “electronic media”—the
one that deals with transmission rather than storage—refers to “[t]ransmission media used to
exchange information already in electronic storage media.” Id. The HHS thus removed the term
“electronic storage media” in the storage context but not in the transmission context. This is
confusing because the HHS’s reason for the terminological change in the first subset of “electronic
media” is that the term “electronic storage media” is “obsolete.” 2013 HHS Report, supra note
140, at 5,575. It is unclear whether this difference is intentional or an oversight. Second, although
the HHS suggested that the terminological change was intended to account for more
technologically-advanced means of storage, the first subset of “electronic media” provides by way
of example the same old-school technology as before. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (referring to
“devices in computers (hard drives) and any removable/transportable digital memory medium,
such as magnetic tape or disk, optical disk, or digital memory card”). The definition thus provides
no clarification with respect to what specific types of storage “material” the terminological change
is meant to sweep in. Third, the definition of “electronic storage material” falls under the
definition of “electronic media,” id., which runs directly counter to the HHS’s reasoning that
“material” would include certain things that “media” excludes. The HHS should thus clarify its
intentions with respect to this terminology.
153. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (“Covered entities must . . . [e]nsure the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of all electronic protected health information the covered entity creates, receives,
maintains, or transmits.”).
154. Id. § 164.312(a)(2)(iv).
155. Id.
156. For a discussion of the importance of encrypting stored data, see supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
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Even more troubling is the extent to which patient privacy is
protected when providers are not in the picture. Data put into a mobile
health application and not shared with a provider are not protected
under HIPAA, regardless of whether PHI is shared in the process.157
In other words, data stored by mobile health vendors or their business
associates fall outside of HIPAA’s scope. This means that mobile
health application developers are free to do whatever they want with
user reports of medication compliance, current moods, and any other
behavioral health information.158 Moreover, to the extent that passively
generated and inferred data from patient inputs—which provide an
additional window of exposure into patients’ mental well-being—are
not collected and shared with providers, those data are similarly devoid
of HIPAA protections.159 What is more, little else serves to restrict
application administrators from freely using this data. Mobile health
entities often sell sensitive health information to big data developers,
which can result in users being bombarded with advertisements
targeted to their mental health conditions.160
4. Archived Telepsychology Sessions. The HHS comments in
recent revisions to the HIPAA Rules make clear that digitally archived
content falls within the Security Rule’s protections, though with all the
aforementioned functional inadequacies.161 With respect to the Privacy
Rule, however, archived telepsychology sessions warrant closer
examination given the special protection that HIPAA confers to
psychotherapy notes.162 Formally, the special protection for
157. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (applying only to “covered entitit[ies]” and their “business
associate[s]”); see also id. § 160.103 (defining “[c]overed entity” and “business associate”); id.
§ 160.103 (narrowly defining “health information,” and thus “e-PHI” for purposes of the Security
Rule, only to include information “created or received by a health care provider, health plan,
public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care
clearinghouse”). Insofar as a mobile health entity does not fall within this definition, any data
stored by the entity, or a third party with whom the entity contracts for data storage purposes, are
outside the scope of “e-PHI,” rendering the Security Rule inapplicable.
158. See Flaherty, supra note 110, at 426.
159. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306. In contrast, when such data are shared with providers, such
transmission falls within the Security Rule.
160. See, e.g., Hall & McGraw, supra note 86, at 217 (“A mobile health app may be financed
by sharing potentially sensitive data from the app with third-party advertisers that target ads to
patients based on app use.”). This would be impermissible if mobile health suppliers had to
comply with HIPAA, which prohibits the “[s]ale of protected health information.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.508(a)(4)(i).
161. For arguments that permissive encryption requirements leave stored data functionally
unprotected, see supra Part III.A.3.
162. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2).
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psychotherapy notes does not extend to archived sessions because the
definition of “psychotherapy notes” only covers “notes recorded . . . by
a health care provider.”163 Quite simply, recorded sessions do not fit
this definition.
A functional examination of the special rule for psychotherapy
notes arguably justifies some sort of special treatment for archived
psychotherapy sessions. The extra protection for psychotherapy notes
is justified on two grounds. First, the information contained within is
particularly sensitive, warranting extra privacy protection.164 This same
rationale certainly extends to the information contained within the
session itself. Moreover, a patient’s personal disclosures, which can
contain objective and highly sensitive statements of fact, may be
inherently more revelatory than the provider’s subjective impressions
about the patient based upon those disclosures. If anything, then, a
patient’s privacy interest in safeguarding archived sessions is stronger
than it is for psychotherapy notes.
The second justification for conferring special protection to
psychotherapy notes is that the information contained within is less
useful to other providers because it reflects the personal notes and
observations of the treatment provider.165 This accessibility interest is
thus considered weaker for information more subjective than PHI. In
other words, in striking a balance between securing the privacy of
health information and making such information available and
accessible to providers, the HHS found it prudent to provide extra
privacy protections for psychotherapy notes because the information
contained within is not particularly useful for other providers.
For other providers, the informative value of recorded sessions is
different than that of psychotherapy notes. Other providers could form
their own subjective impressions of patients from watching recorded
sessions more so than with psychotherapy notes. But other providers
could presumably also elicit the same objective information from that
patient more efficiently in sessions of their own. In contrast, without
access to the original therapist’s notes, another provider would be
unable to obtain the subjective impressions of other therapists about
their patients. In this respect, recorded sessions would be less
informative for other providers.

163. Id. § 164.501.
164. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,623 (Dec. 28, 2000).
165. Id.
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There are thus two possibilities here. If recorded sessions are seen
as less valuable to providers than psychotherapy notes, and the
accessibility interest is weaker, then both the privacy and accessibility
interests justify keeping this information at least as private as
psychotherapy notes. If recorded sessions are seen as more valuable to
providers than psychotherapy notes, then the needle moves in both
directions: both the privacy and accessibility concerns are stronger.
While it is possible, in the abstract, that the proper balance would be
struck already without extra protection, the underlying functional
considerations on the privacy side would at least warrant a deeper
examination into the question of whether archived sessions ought to
receive special protection.
B. Complexities of Telemental Health Compliance Under State Law
Privacy and security laws and regulations that apply to telemental
health vary widely state by state. One important set of laws are those
governing medical privacy generally. Some states have privacy regimes
intended to be comprehensive like HIPAA.166 The detail and
specificity of these laws increases the likelihood that HIPAA preempts
them. Each state also has some sort of statute governing the treatment
of mental health records.167 Some states have laws that apply only to
hospitalized or institutionalized mental health patients,168 many have
laws for those who are involuntarily committed,169 several states have
laws applicable only to mental health providers like psychologists or
social workers,170 and many have some sort of generally applicable
mental health privacy statute.171 State privacy laws applicable

166. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE D. 1, pt. 2.6 (2007); MONT. CODE § 50-16-529 (2009); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH § 18(6) (2017); VA. CODE § 32.1-127.1:03(D) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.02.050(1)(a) (2012).
167. 1 Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n, HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 17:30 (2017); see id. at
app. 17:3 (providing an exhaustive list of state laws concerning the privacy of mental health
records).
168. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-340C(8) & (13) (2016); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 33.13 (2017); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122C-55 (2014).
169. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 66-348 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-961 (2007); TEN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-6-601 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.360 (2016).
170. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-218 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112 § 129A (2017);
MO. REV. STAT. § 337.636 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-2136 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-9A27
(2016); UTAH CODE ANN. 58-61-602(2)(c) (2011).
171. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-56-4(b)(6) (2017), 22-56-10 (1995); LA. STAT. ANN. § 28.171(A)
(2017).
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specifically to mental health patients are usually more stringent than
HIPAA and therefore not preempted.172
State telemedicine laws complicate things further, as many states
have separate laws governing privacy and security in the telehealth
context. For patient privacy, many states have laws mandating
confidentiality for telehealth patients generally.173 New York protects
the confidentiality of mentally disabled patients treated via
telepsychiatry,174 while South Carolina’s protections kick in only for
“licensee[s] who establish[] a physician-patient relationship solely via
telemedicine.”175 With respect to security, Delaware requires identity
verification for telebehavioral health practitioners,176 and Texas has
enacted broad technology and security standards that are more
stringent than HIPAA.177 Oklahoma simply requires telehealth
providers to comply with HIPAA.178
In parallel, state laws that govern information sharing vary widely.
Unlike HIPAA, many states allow information sharing for treatment
purposes without patient consent only in limited circumstances, such
as within a given hospital department,179 among providers jointly
participating in coordinated care programs,180 or among state treatment

172. See LISA J. ACEVEDO & JENNIFER L. RATHBURN, MEDICAL PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT
8 (2011) (“The state laws governing more sensitive types
of health information . . . are almost always more stringent than HIPAA.”).
173. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3602 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-80-404(e) (2017);
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2290.5(b), (f) (2016); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 22.01.15.012–
22.01.15.015 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 310.200(1) (2000); MD. CODE REGS. 10.32.05.05, 06
(2017); 30-026 MISS. CODE R. § 2635:5.3–5.6 (LexisNexis 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8505
(1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-25-4 (2004).
174. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, §§ 596.5–596.6 (2016).
175. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-37(C) (2016).
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1769D (2017).
177. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 174.2–174.12 (2017); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 111.002–03
(2005).
178. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 435:10-7-13 (2017). However, for why this congruence is not so
simple after all, see supra note 141, which explains how an Oklahoma agency misapplied HIPAA
in a telehealth case.
179. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.31(A)(6) (2017) (allowing “hospitals and other
institutions and facilities within the department of mental health and addiction services [to]
exchange psychiatric records and other pertinent information with other hospitals, institutions,
and facilities of the department” without patient authorization).
180. See D.C. CODE § 7-1203.01 (2015) (allowing unauthorized disclosure of mental health
information for treatment purposes within an “individual mental health facility” but requiring
patient authorization for disclosure “to another health care provider”).
AND PENALTIES: HIPAA GETS TEETH
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programs.181 Other states follow HIPAA’s lead in allowing disclosure
for treatment purposes without consent but diverge from HIPAA in
limiting the amount of information that can be disclosed.182 HIPAA
would not preempt these laws because they more stringently protect
patient privacy. But these laws upset the balance that HIPAA strikes
between privacy and information sharing.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS
Part IV suggests federal changes that could improve patient
privacy for telemental and mobile health and explores a number of
ways in which the HIPAA Rules can be made more stringent. For
example, the HHS should extend the Security Rule to cover
transmissions during telemental health sessions and require
encryptions in all relevant contexts. Further, mobile health entities
should be subject to the HIPAA Rules, and the HHS should provide
special protection for archived psychotherapy sessions just as for
psychotherapy notes. This Part then argues that Congress or the HHS
should preempt the field with such changes, at least in the spheres of
telemental and mobile health. With such sensitive information at stake,
floor preemption is inappropriate and a state-by-state regime is
impractical because patients increasingly seek treatment in different
states—making national solutions the best contenders. The inherent
balance underlying the formulation of the Rules further justifies field
preemption. Simple “floor” preemption does not mesh with the fact
that the Rules embody legislative and regulatory choices made to strike
a balance in the face of competing policy considerations.
A. Strengthening the Federal Regime
The analysis in Part II identifies a number of gaps within the
HIPAA Rules in the context of telemental health. Congress or the
HHS should strengthen the Security Rule, extend the Privacy and
Security Rules to cover mobile health applications, and except
recorded psychotherapy sessions from the Privacy Rule in the same
mold as currently for psychotherapy notes. The Security Rule’s

181. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161(13)(f) (2017) (allowing unauthorized disclosure “[t]o
Departmental contractors to the extent necessary for professional consultation or services”).
182. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 1-109(A)(2) (2013) (“The information available to persons
actively engaged in the treatment of the consumer or in related administrative work shall be
limited to the minimum amount of information necessary for the person or agency to carry out its
function.”).
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limitation to e-PHI makes it formally inapplicable to information
transmitted during telemental health sessions because patients
communicate PHI, but not e-PHI, to providers. Transmitting data to
providers through mobile health applications falls formally under the
Security Rule’s protections but suffers the same functional
inadequacies as for synchronous communication generally. More
troubling, such transmissions may be completely unprotected if the
information is transmitted directly to a patient’s EHR. To close these
gaps, PHI stored by telehealth and other medical providers must be
safeguarded under the Security Rule, but even then, the rule still fails
to require encryption of such information, rendering it functionally
inadequate. Archived telepsychology sessions receive basic HIPAA
protection but lack the special protections granted to psychotherapy
notes. Further still, would-be PHI stored by mobile health entities,
companies that produce mobile health applications, or the business
associates of these mobile health entities falls outside of HIPAA
altogether, leaving broad categories of sensitive information
completely unprotected. Patients aware of these security risks will be
less inclined to take advantage of this technology.183
Certain modifications to the Rules could ameliorate these
problems. First and foremost, the Security Rule must be extended to
cover transmissions during telemental health sessions. In light of the
emergence and rapid growth of online therapy sessions, no justifiable
reason exists for preserving the technical distinction between PHI and
e-PHI that renders the Security Rule inapplicable in this context.
Congress or the HHS could remedy this oversight in a couple of ways.
One option would be to eliminate the definitional requirement that
PHI is only e-PHI in transmission if it “exist[ed] in electronic form
immediately before the transmission.”184 Thus, the Security Rule would
apply to any transmissions of e-PHI, including in real-time
communication. Changing the definition of e-PHI in this way, however,
would extend the coverage of the Security Rule to one category of
transmissions that the HHS has expressed an intention not to protect—
specifically, facsimile transmissions of printed copies of information
that existed “in electronic form” but did not exist in this form
183. For an explanation of the centrality of privacy considerations in users’ evaluations of the
utility of health information technology, see infra note 188. Thus, even with the limited extent
such information might be useful to hackers, in contrast with the lucrative value of more objective
health data, the utility of this technology is unlikely to be maximized without addressing these
concerns.
184. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017).
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“immediately before transmission.”185 The better option would thus
simply be to legislate or promulgate an agency rule extending the
Security Rule to telemental health sessions.
Second, encrypting PHI when it is being stored and transmitted
should be required rather than optional. The Security Rule is
technologically outdated in this respect, promulgated to protect PHI
transmitted electronically between providers and for administrative
purposes. Now, telehealth sessions also implicate the electronic
exchange of information during the actual course of treatment, making
transmission security much more pressing. Additionally, mobile health
applications dramatically increase the amount of data transmitted and
stored with covered entities. This is a simple fix, as Congress or the
HHS would merely need to switch the designation from “addressable”
to “required.”186 This would give the Security Rule more bite while
preserving the underlying flexibility that covered entities have in
choosing how to implement even required specifications.187 Whether
such a change is necessary in the health or mental health context
broadly is beyond the scope of this Note, but securing communication
channels for telemental health sessions is undeniably vital.
Third, the Privacy and Security Rules should be extended to cover
mobile health entities. Currently, patients using mobile health
applications share sensitive health information with mobile health
entities, and HIPAA protects neither the privacy nor security of such
information. This could be achieved by amending the definitions of
“covered entity” and “individually identifiable health information” to
include mobile health entities. The Security Rule would then apply to
the storage and transmission of data through mobile health
applications. Moreover, mobile health entities would be barred by the
Privacy Rule from sharing any information beyond what is minimally
necessary for the provision of or payment for healthcare, which would
curtail profit-motivated disclosures by such entities to big data
developers.188

185. See 2013 HHS Report, supra note 140, at 5,576 (“[I]nclud[ing] the word ‘immediately,’
to exclude transmissions when the information exchanged did not exist in electronic form
immediately before transmission . . . clarifies that . . . accepting a hardcopy document for
transmission is not a covered transmission even though the document may have originated from
printing from an electronic file.”).
186. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(1).
187. Id. § 164.306(b).
188. Such regulatory pressure would likely increase the operating costs of mobile health
entities. In particular, mobile health entities may be less inclined to make their applications freely
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Fourth, Congress or the HHS should confer on archived
psychotherapy sessions the same special protection given to
psychotherapy notes. This protection is justified by the particularly
sensitive nature of the information and its lack of informative value
based on its personal nature. Given the highly sensitive nature of
archived sessions, the associated privacy concerns are even stronger
than for psychotherapy notes. Evidence shows that patients find
therapeutic value in watching archived sessions,189 so the law ought to
allow and not overly deter these archived sessions. Given general
patient privacy concerns and more specific mental health stigma
concerns, patients would be more amenable to recorded sessions if they
knew that the recording could not be transmitted without their
permission. And, ultimately, getting patients to consent to recorded
sessions in the first place is a threshold requirement for maximizing
such value to be gained from the use of this technology. Altogether,
these considerations warrant special protection for archived
psychotherapy sessions.
Lastly, Congress or the HHS should strengthen requirements that
covered entities periodically review their security practices under the
Security Rule. As it stands, HIPAA regulations mandate such periodic
review but do not specify how often it must occur.190 However, because
the telemental health and cybersecurity industries continue to develop

available because they would lose out on their revenue streams vis-à-vis selling information
extracted from consumers with mental health problems. In other words, consumers would likely
have to pay more to use mobile health applications if the entities responsible for these
applications are no longer allowed to profit from selling their sensitive health information. But
given the centrality of privacy concerns with respect to consumers’ perceived utility of health
information technology like mobile health, consumers would likely prefer this tradeoff. See
Heather Landi, Survey: Patients Skeptical of Health IT Due to Privacy, Security Concerns,
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.healthcare-informatics.com/newsitem/cybersecurity/survey-patients-distrust-health-it-due-privacy-security-concerns
[https://perma.cc/CQH9-2FAQ] (“57 percent [of consumers] with contact experience to [medical]
technology this past year report being skeptical of the overall benefits of health information
technologies such as patient portals, mobile apps, and electronic health records . . . because of
recently reported data hacking and a perceived lack of privacy protection by providers . . . .”).
189. Luxton et al., supra note 9, at 506.
190. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e) (“A covered entity or business associate must review and
modify the security measures implemented under this subpart as needed to continue provision of
reasonable and appropriate protection of electronic protected health information . . . .”)
(emphasis added). But see 42 U.S.C. § 17931(c) (2018) (“[T]he Secretary of Health and Human
Services shall, after consultation with stakeholders, annually issue guidance on the most effective
and appropriate technical safeguards . . . and . . . security standards . . . .”) (emphasis added). The
inconsistency between the regulatory and statutory review requirements further warrants
reconsideration of the appropriate standards for periodic review.
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rapidly, regularly revising industry practice with respect to the privacy
and security of sensitive information is vital.191 Instituting a time frame
under the Security Rule for mandatory periodic review by covered
entities of their own practices would strengthen the rule and better
account for the rapid technological growth in this field and the law’s
general inability to keep up.192 This would remain in keeping with the
intended flexibility of the Rule193 by allowing covered entities to
conduct their own reviews.194
B. Streamlining the Federal Regime by Preempting the Field
After modifying the Rules as suggested above, Congress or the
HHS should ensure that HIPAA preempts the state rules that
currently share the same space, at least in the telemental health
domain.195 Preempting state law before updating the Rules would make
things worse, because it would risk stifling further legal development
and leaving citizens in states with more stringent privacy and security
laws than the Rules even less protected than they are now. If the Rules
were modified in the ways suggested above, however, Congress or the
HHS should make it so that they preempt the field—at least in the
context of telemental health. Field preemption is necessary given the
possibilities of interstate telemental health treatment. Field
preemption also makes more sense than floor preemption because the
Rules are not one dimensional; rather, they reflect an intended balance
between competing policy considerations.
First, telemental health for the first time makes interstate
treatment a real and prevalent phenomenon, which lends further
credence to preempting the wide variety of state law that could
otherwise apply here. Under a state-by-state regime, providers treating

191. Heverly, supra note 86, passim.
192. See FTC, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
passim (2014) (arguing that the law has been slow to keep up with technological advancements in
data analytics, threatening consumer privacy with respect to health and other information).
193. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (“Flexibility of approach.”).
194. Although requiring more revision could increase compliance costs, such costs would be
offset by other proposed changes. For example, requiring encryption standards as opposed to
deeming them merely “addressable” would eliminate the risk-analysis costs associated with
reassessing whether neglecting to implement addressable safeguards would be “reasonable and
appropriate.” In addition, periodic-review requirements could vary temporally based on such
factors as the size and longevity of the regulated entity as well as the sensitivity and magnitude of
the health information they manage.
195. Congress or the HHS can accomplish this simply by including a provision clearly
expressing the intention to preempt the field.
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patients in other states will have to know which laws govern the
treatment relationship in order to comply with them, 196 and there are
essentially two options for the governing law.197 One would be to apply
the law of the provider’s state, which would make the provider’s job
safer and more efficient but would leave patients without the
protections that they would otherwise expect.198 The other option is to
apply the law of the patient’s state, which would ensure that the patient
receives any expected protections but would create an opportunity cost
for the provider in having to deal with administrative matters rather
than treating patients.199 Additionally, providers having to deal with a
variety of state laws may be deterred either from offering telehealth
services in the first place or from offering those services to patients in
certain states, which would restrict access and hamper progress in the
industry.200 Furthermore, neither state-by-state solution would do
much to help industry actors seeking to innovate, because they must
still navigate the complex web of state law. Streamlining the federal
regime by preempting the field would add clarity and facilitate
innovation vis-à-vis greater predictability.

196. The implications of interstate treatment have led many commentators to advocate for
federal licensure standards for telehealth providers. See Marino et al., supra note 58, passim;
Schumacher, supra note 54, at 431–32.
197. The two basic options contemplated above are simply to apply the laws either of the
patient’s or provider’s state to all parties involved in treatment. There is, however, at least one
more option that could be explored that would adequately accommodate interests in federalism,
involving “reciprocity statutes” or interstate compacts through which multiple states band
together, as in the Nurse Licensure Compact. See Schumacher, supra note 54, at 423 (“The [Nurse
Licensure Compact] allows a nurse with a valid license to practice in other states party to the
compact, both in person and through telecommunications technology, subject to the other states’
practice laws and discipline.”). However, Professor Schumacher argues that “the slow rate of
adoption among the states prevents the model from significantly affecting licensure portability.”
Id. at 424. In addition, such a system makes far less sense in the context of patient privacy, which
confers substantive protections to healthcare consumers, than in licensure, which fulfills largely
administrative functions.
198. One of federalism’s hallmarks is that state diversity engenders legal innovation and
experimentation. Health-information privacy, however, is not an appropriate subject for
experimentation given the sensitivity of the information involved. Legal experimentation is
particularly inappropriate for mental health given the high risks of privacy breaches and the de
facto permanence of potential data exposures. Finally, experimentation is even more
inappropriate with respect to telemental and mobile health, where information can be exposed
more easily over the internet.
199. This would also frustrate one of HIPAA’s main objectives—streamlining EHR usage.
200. See Schumacher, supra note 54, at 420 (“The biggest barrier preventing the widespread
implementation of telehealth services in the United States is the fact that states regulate the
practice of medicine within their own boundaries.”).
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In addition, the balancing function of the Rules is already
inconsistent with floor preemption. The Rules’ purposes are not
singular; rather, they aim to strike a balance between information
privacy and availability.201 The Rules recognize patient interests in
maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive medical information but
also the utility of having records available to other providers for
treatment and efficiency purposes.202 Though HIPAA’s regulatory and
statutory texts explicitly set a floor rather than preempt the field,203 the
balancing function calls into question the propriety of considering their
requirements in a one-dimensional way, as a floor. With respect to the
Privacy Rule, for example, more stringent state laws frustrate the
purpose of the federal regime by making information sharing more
difficult.204 It is thus already illogical for the Rules to be treated for
preemption purposes as setting a floor rather than occupying the field.
The emergence of telemental health shakes up the underlying
policy considerations on each side of the scale, which makes
reexamination of the proper preemptive function of the Rules all the
more logically compelled. In particular, with conventional treatment,
no security concerns arise regarding the treatment setting itself—the
security concerns arise after the fact, with data storage and
transmission. But privacy and security concerns are inherent in the
provision of telemental health treatment.205 The privacy and security
risks associated with telehealth thus implicate policy considerations
with respect to access to treatment. Thus, floor preemption makes even
less sense in the context of telemental health because privacy and
security considerations cannot be balanced with information
availability along a single continuum.
In other words, a reformulation of HIPAA that properly
accounted for the policy considerations at play would not simply be

201. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2012) (conferring general privacy protections to patients’
health information but allowing disclosure for treatment purposes).
202. Specifically, the Omnibus Rule contemplates that the most cost-effective way to make
health information accessible is through EHRs and electronic health tools generally. For further
discussion of the Omnibus Rule, see supra note 102.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b).
204. As applied to conventional treatment modalities, this paradoxical effect may have been
largely mitigated given the limited utility of sharing treatment information with providers in other
states—as well as limited instances of providers treating out-of-state patients. Telehealth,
however, flips this on its head, further justifying reexamination of the functional inconsistencies
of HIPAA’s preemptive status.
205. For example, unlike in a conventional face-to-face therapy session, a telepsychology
session itself implicates privacy and security considerations.
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able to balance privacy with accessibility; additionally, it would have to
incorporate access to treatment into the policy calculus. This necessary
balancing of multiple policy considerations in reformulating the Rules
increases the likelihood that treating the Rules as simple “floors,”
which only above or below a state’s rule could lie, would obfuscate at
least part of the functional purpose of the Rules. Congress or the HHS
should therefore preempt the field with the changes to HIPPA
suggested in this Note.
CONCLUSION
Mental health care in the United States is saturated with problems,
ranging from stigmatic concerns that deter patients from seeking
treatment in the first place to cost and access issues that moderate the
ability to begin and continue regular treatment for all patients.
Telemental and mobile health platforms offer promising ways to
overcome these central problems in mental health care, but privacy and
security concerns stand in the way of fully taking advantage of these
emergent technologies. The current legal landscape is ill-equipped to
secure patient privacy given the dramatic increases in transmitted and
stored health information. To the extent that HIPAA even applies,
covered entities are free to leave this stored and transmitted data
unencrypted, rendering the information unacceptably exposed. Worse
still, HIPAA is outdated, which leaves telemental health sessions and
stored mobile health data totally unprotected. And a complex web of
state laws and regulations creates inefficiencies regarding provider
practices, industry innovation, and legal administrability. The changes
to the HIPAA Rules identified in this Note would dramatically
improve patient privacy rights. Preempting the field with such changes
would create a landscape more readily navigable by providers and
industry members alike, facilitate interstate treatment, and enable
while enabling the federal government to strike an appropriate balance
between information availability and privacy.

